Norway and the European Union

When Norway gained its independent from Sweden in 1905, (the country having been ceded to Sweden by Denmark in 1814) creating its own monarchy and political governing body, the mood of the Norwegian people was really one of isolationism (Burch, 2005, 2). The reason behind creating the monarchy might at first strike the historian being strange, given that Norway was seeking independence and had been under the Swedish monarchy. However, the reason for creating Norway’s monarchy, and inviting Denmark’s Prince Carl to be Norway’s king, was very much a political decision, and focused on an important issue with which Norway continues to be concerned about today in its decision not to join the European Union; that is, security (Burch, 2005, 2). In 1905 when Norway established its independence, it also established its monarchy, inviting Prince Carl, whose princess wife was Maud, the daughter of England’s King Edward VII (Burch, 2005, 2). This was a move that was intended to establish a tie between Norway and England, and one which would hopefully secure some measure of resource for Norway should it become necessary for Norway to protect itself from invading forces; as was the realization that such was the need in 1940 when Norway, and the world, realized Germany’s determination in taking over all of Europe, including Norway (Burch, 2005, 2).

First Attempts to join the EC

However, it is the Norwegian lingering sense of isolationism, the craving to remain independent and autonomous in its political rule and decision making process, and perhaps even Norwegian’s historical recollection of 400 years of foreign domination that even today prevent it from becoming a full member of the European Union, joining 24 of its European neighbors and allies in a common social, economic, and political agenda that could eventually lead to subordination of the Norwegian people’s autonomy to foreign policy and decision makers.

Oddly enough, because the question of security played heavy on Norway’s decision not to full integrate into the EU, but in 1948 when the European Community (becoming the EU) was originally conceived in the body of the Brussels Treaty Organization, it was the subject and the notion of European security in a post World War II environment from which the EU has since that time evolved (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 373). The progress and evolution of the BTO and the emerging EU was eclipsed when, in 1949, NATO emerged as the ruling entity and authority on European security, and it was an organization that had the full backing of the United States, and allowed the United States membership and participation since it was not exclusively European in nature (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 373). The BTO surrendered its defense structures and policy making and decision making authority to NATO (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 373).

When, in 2005, Norway celebrated both its 100 years of independence from Sweden, and was faced with its 2005 general election during which the question of integration into the European Union would once again be put to voters; it was perhaps the historical memory, again, that ultimately defeated the prospects of integration – again – into the European Union. In 2005, there were still a good many Norwegians whose historical recollection of German occupation as the last foreign occupier of the country, served as perhaps a warning of allowing Norway to once again become subject to the decisions and policies of foreigners – even if those foreigners constitute the largely Anglo European community (Burch, 2005, 2). Under Operation Weseruebung, the Germans had arrived in Norway on April 9, 1940, and remained in control of Norway and Denmark until the end of the war (Breuer, 2001, 43). When the Germans left Norway at the end of World War II, they devastated Norway’s northern region, burning out Norwegian families, and reportedly committing atrocious crimes against the Norwegian civilians such that even today the Norwegian’s intense nationalism is in large part a result of German occupation during World War II (Derry and Greve, 1983, 177).

Still, in 2005, as it was in 1905, and as it continues to be today, Norwegians focused on the issue of security above and beyond all others and, in 2005, rejected, once again, the notion of making a commitment to the European Union (Burch, 2005, 2). Norway has resisted the European Union since its inception in the 1950s (Gsthol, 2002, p. 2). It was probably in large measure, at first, the post war Norwegian sense of nationalism and the fear of foreign domination 1950s (Gsthol, 2002, p. 69).

Norway was not alone in its position in this regard, and was actually one of six nations, including Britain, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway and Portugal (Gsthol, 2002, p. 2), but the BTO did not disappear, and evolved until in 1954 it took on the identity of the Western European Union (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 373). At the time when its treaty was formalized, it had increased its European membership backing supported by West German and Italy (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 373). This, however, did not mean that the countries that supported the mission of the WEU surrendered unto that entity their sovereignty. The question of whether or not to surrender national sovereignty would be one that would arise later. It is, in fact, surrendering sovereign autonomy is part and parcel of full integration into the EU, and it is the risk that countries like Britain and Norway are not willing to accept (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 39). “The project has always been a risky enterprise, involving unprecedented and experimental acts of cooperation between sovereign nation-states (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 39).”

What appeals to the individual European nation-states about the European Union, is its mission to harness the world’s largest single capitalist market as unified economic force (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 39). “The internal market has the power to overwhelm public power entirely unless it is wielded collectively at the EU level (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 39).” There is no denying the potential force and power posed by a fully integrated EU.

Arguments in favor of Norway’s full integration into the EU arose in 1972 and, again, in 1994, when Norway’s Labor Party and the Conservative Party became significant players in Norway’s political system, and advocates of full integration into the EU. Each time, however, the initiatives to fully integrate Norway into the EU failed; and then, again, it failed in 2005. There are several reasons for this, not the least of which are political and economic, but especially, at least in 2005, the economic aspects of the Norwegian voter’s decision not to fully integrate was a compelling factor (Gasthol, 2002, 69).

Norway’s Economy

Norway’s economy has, like its political and social systems, evolved into one that is rich and one that is much admired world-wide for its stability and overall economic productivity. Fishing is, and has always been, a strong economic factor in Norway’s economy (Gstohl, 2003, 130). Norway has complete control over its fishing waters along a 12-mile zone of its entire coast, and at the present time is not compelled to share those waters with other European nations. That, of course would change if Norway is fully integrated into theEU (Gstohl, 2003, 130).

The Norwegians have a strong history of protectionism when it comes to their fishing industry and waters (Thaden, 2001, 129). Throughout different periods in its history, Norway and Russia have had to resolve differences and develop relationships that would facilitate the use of Norwegian waters and territories in the most northern part of that country that had historically been shared between the two countries (Thaden, 2001, 129). While the issues were, by 1991, seemingly resolved in an amicable and workable solution satisfying both countries, it serves to demonstrate Norway’s tenacious protectionism of its coast and fishing industry. That oil has become a commodity found off the coast of Norway would only serve to make the country all the more adamant in protecting its rights, and not they would probably not be willing to surrender those rights to the control of the EU decision making authorities.

Another strong economic factor in Norway’s economy is its oil production. Having discovered its oil reserve during the 1960s, Norway is now the world’s seventh largest oil producer (Gstohl, 2003, 130). During past years when oil prices have been depressed, it might have benefited Norway to have been a fully integrated member of the EU, however in today’s current market there exists no incentive whatsoever for Norway to take its oil economy to a fully integrated status in the EU where, like its fishing industry, it would have to surrender some measure of control over that important economic resource.

The country’s economic stability and what it would bring with it to the EU should it at some future date elect to fully integrate into the EU – and the EU Court has made that future prospect much more desirable by virtue of its emergence as a deciding force in sorting out the issues that continue to keep nation-states from fully integrating into the EU (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 337).

However, since its independence in 1905, Norway has worked towards building a strong economic base for its economy, although farmers and farming, too, continue to be strong identities in the nationalistic perception of Norwegians, its fishing industry, oil production and other natural resources. Norway’s fishing industry is strong, although the country has some concerns about pollution and environmental issues, they’re not strong or serious enough to adversely impact Norway’s fishing economy.

First Attempts to Join the EC

At its inception, in 1948, the European Union was known as has the European Community, the EC; that a fully integrated Norway would mean economic enlargement for the EU. It offered attractive benefits to the European nations, and initially those benefits were comprised of a unified security system and economic incentives. One of the most appealing benefits for Norway, certainly appealing to Norway’s farmers, is a subsidized farm plan that would generate income for Norway’s farmers who are impacted by the geographical region and the climate conditions, two factors that keep Norway’s farmers at an otherwise low economic level of contribution to Norway’s overall economy

The laws that govern the EU’s subsidy programs are complex, and while they may at first appear as an incentive to Norwegian farmers, the rules governing subsidies are based on the WTO rules, and “provides for the imposition of duties when subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the Community industry producing goods like the imported ones and the imposition of such duties would be in the Community interest (Henry, Hyett, and Macleod, 1996, 281). Based on that language, Norway’s farmers would enjoy some measure of economic protection and benefit should Norway fully integrate. It is this kind of incentive that has turned some Norwegians in favor of full integration.

In 1950 when the European Union was evolving from a concept into an organization, the Norwegian government was not adverse to the idea of being a member, but rejected the idea of surrendering its economic and political decision making powers to a European body that might not look out for Norway’s best interest (Gsthol, 2002, p. 46).

Norway and the EFTA

As has already been mentioned, from its inception the EC/EU represented the potential for economic success and power by pulling together its member nation-state’s economic resources that, together, would make Europe the most formidable market economy in the world. Unfortunately, for nations like Norway, the quid pro quo of what Norway would bring to the table vs. The return on that contribution, versus the potential loss in non-economic areas, was too great for Norway to consider either its fishing industry or natural resources, or worth surrendering its political autonomy.

EFTA, European Free Trade Association, is the response of the European nations that did not immediately join the EU/EC. The effort to unify the European countries initially divided, rather than unify Europeans in perspectives as regards the EC/EU (Gsthol, 2002, 2). Perhaps even to some extent to cause unification of the divided through the employment of certain economic measures that, if successful, could negatively impact the economies of the countries who resisted the philosophy of the EC/EU, the EC went for the long-term economic position of favoring “supranational customs union with the long-term objective of a political union (Gsthol, 2002, 2). Those countries that resisted the EC, again, consisting of Great Britain, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland; responded with EFTA, European Free Trade Association (Gsthol, 2002, 2). It was their goal that EFTA would keep open the European markets to free trade, perhaps ignoring the EC/EU objectives and goals (Gsthol, 2002, 2). However, it was just the following year that Great Britain, Norway and Denmark (and Ireland) joined the EC (Gsthol, 2002, 2). This does not mean that they “fully integrated,” only that they applied to be members (Gsthol, 2002, 2). Their application was vetoed by France, who vetoed the EFTA countries the second time they applied too (Gsthol, 2002, 2). It was only after the resignation of DeGaulle that the EFTA countries were admitted, but by that particular point in time Norway responded to its country’s adverse reaction to the notion of joining, and did not reapply to join the EC (Gsthol, 2002, 2). By 1984, the EC and EFTA countries had entered into free trade agreements (FTAs), which proved successful and served to bind those EFTA countries, whose membership had increased, with the EC, if not in a formal manner, at least with respect to certain economic measures as governed by the FTAs (Gsthol, 2002, 2).

The relationship between the EFTA countries and the EC was and is complex in nature and continues to be subject to evolving and updated referendums and agreements. Short of the individual agreements, and short of EFTA in the legalese in which it is described, EFTA served to bind those countries with the EC in a way that kept them in negotiations and working toward what might become full integration into the EU. Especially since much of the EU economic and trade policy that has emerged from it have been policies and agreements that are friendly and fair to the non-integrated countries, encouraging continued trade and, thusly, continued negotiations of those country’s relationships with and within the EU.

However, friendly as the EU’s economic policies may be, and perhaps they are designed to keep the relationship between the EU and those non-EU countries open and in forward progress mode, the EU has continued to issue policies that have limited even further than ever before the sovereignty of individual nation-states (Gsthol, 2002, 3).

The 1980’s: Conservative Governments Rule Norway

It was during the 1980s that the EU’s foreign and security policies evolved to a more attractive level such as was needed to attract Norway’s conservative government leadership (Gsthol, 2002, 157). However, the WEU was revived and earned the support of Greece and Portugal, and Portugal, like Norway, had held out against committed integration into the EC/EU; and Greece, too, became a supporting nation of the WEU (Gsthol, 2002, 157). Unfortunately, there arose disagreements between the United States and its NATO partners (Gsthol, 2002, 157). The disagreements between the U.S. And its NATO allies only bolstered their leaning towards their own European neighbors, who, as Europeans, interests would be more in line with Norway’s own. As Norway pursued relationships with its European neighbors, it became apparent that the only way to pursue relations and to build relationships that would be politically and economically advantageous would be for Norway to become a member of the EC (Gsthol, 2002, 157).

A second try to join the EC, now called EU

In 1994, the referendum for full integration into the EU went before the Norwegian people; they voted no. The prevailing mood of the people during the 1994 election was one of nationalism, and lack of confidence in the EU’s leadership abilities on a world scale. In 1994, the EU had made little impact as a unified body on world political policy or decision processes on global or even on a European level. This may be because the EU was still evolving, and continues to do so, although clearly today the EU is no longer in its infancy.

Reasons for the “No”-decision

If we listen closely to the message of Knut Vollebaek, he suggests that the status quo with the European Union is to the satisfaction of Norwegians. “Despite not being a member,” Vollebaek says, “Norway has developed extensive links with the European Union, which accounts for approximately 75% of Norwegian trade (Vollebaek, 2003, 1). After all, Norwegians have benefited from trade agreements between itself and the EU in ways that even member states have not; without making any sacrifices for that benefit. If Norway joined the EU, they would have to surrender sovereignty over its fishing waters to the control of the EU (Gstohl, 2002, 130). Efforts were made to resolve this problem, and the EU made concessions that would have allowed Norway to maintain control over its waters during a 10-year transitional period (Gstohl, 2002, 135). Had Norway fully integrated in 1972, by the 1980s it would have been required to surrender its control over its fishing waters to other member states of the EU (Gstohl, 2002, 135). As might be expected, Norway’s fishermen rejected any idea of losing control over their fishing waters (Gstohl, 2002, 135).

In 1994, Norway’s fishing industry, farm industry, and its trade unions – in a departure from its 1972 position of pro-EU, all held together in a voting bloc that opposed full integration into the EU (Gstohl, 2002, 197). With the question of full integration on its election agenda, some 88% of Norwegian citizens turned out for the vote; 52.2% of them voting against full integration with the EU (Gstohl, 2002, 197).

Also, primary Norwegian exports like steel and aluminum

Norway’s future: is it likely to join?

The future for Norway becoming fully integrated into the EU is difficult to predict, but the Iraq war and Norway’s alliance with its European neighbors against American policy and against an American presence in Iraq is aligning the country in the direction of its European Union allies (Vollebaeck, 2003, 1). In a speech delivered by Norway’s Ambassador to the United States, Knut Vollebaeck, the Ambassador remarked, “For the first time since the second referendum in 1994, support for membership has increased even among groups such as women and voters in rural areas who were previously among the strongest opponents of EU entry (Vollebaeck, 2003, 1).” Women enjoy a large bloc of political clout in Norway, even though it continues to have a majority male population (Kelber, 1994, 82). In 1991, Norway’s prime minister was a woman, and eight of 19 cabinet members were women (Kelber, 1994, 82). This would help explain the importance of the Norwegian perception that the EU find some equality in its application of its member states’ social welfare systems; and why Norway has accomplished an equality in those social program areas.

This is a departure from the views expressed in 1999 by Birn Tore Godal (Godal, 1999, 1). In 1999, Godal’s remarks indicated that there was less movement towards Norway’s total integration into the EU than do Vollebaeck’s comments in 2003. In 1999, Godal said, “Despite all that we have in common, we have chosen – or have been compelled to choose, different paths in international affairs (Godal, 1999, 1).” Godal’s remarks indicate a continuing divide between Norway’s political philosophies and those of the EU member nation-states. However, as recently as 2003, Vollebaeck’s remarks indicate a closing of that divide, and he attributes it largely to the United States by virtue of its response to the War on Terror and invasion of Iraq.

It should be acknowledged, too, that there is a new wave of young people who will be the Norwegian leaders of tomorrow, and there is every reason to suspect that this new generation of Norwegians, like their counterparts around the world, represent the new generation that has been raised on the messages of the world community, going even beyond the European Union. However, there is every reason to believe too, that these young people will express their ideas and assert their leadership and direct the resources of their country in a way that benefits the European community, and that that direction of comment and power and resources will be through membership in the European Union.

One of the differences Norway has had with the EU is lack of equality that applies to people of the nation-states. There is a disparity in the individual nation-state social welfare systems, while those systems in the Scandinavian countries, including Norway, have always been administered without consideration of immigrant status (Gstohl, 2002, 197). There has always been an effort to create and maintain equilibrium of sorts between societal groups, such as farmers, fishermen, and other groups who would otherwise experience social and economic hardships by virtue of economic conditions (Gstohl, 2002, 197). This has not been achieved by member states of the EU, and to date the EU has done little in the way of policy making to indicate that it is willing to take social welfare in the direction of establishing parity and eradicating poverty between societal groups.

Like any other country, the nation-states of the EU are faced with economic concerns that arise out of social issues like healthcare, education, employment, retirement and other social issues that its member-states are facing. These are issues that Norway has successfully dealt with as a nation in its own social welfare agenda. Felipe Gonzalez (1999) writes that the European Monetary Union (EMU) has commonly been held responsible for those issues because they’re believed to be the result of the EMU’s management of the Euro (Gonzaelz, 1999, 1). These unresolved policy issues send messages to countries like Norway that not enough is being done to address them, and even member nation-states share that concern (Gonzalez, 1999,1). These social issues in combination with fears arising out of the move towards globalization “is strengthening narrow nationalism (Gonzalez, 1999, 1),” Gonzalez says.

People both within and outside of the EU look to EU leadership to address the problems that cause people to fear the notion of globalization when in fact globalization is part and parcel the result of unification. Member states expect the EU to be consistent and economically sound foreign policy and directives and initiatives (Gonzalez, 1999, 1). If the EU does not issue economically sound and consistent foreign and social policies that resemble a consensus of its member states as a unified force, then it gives the appearance of but a philosophy to be tried and, when it fails, cast aside to the same economic and political junk pile as communism (Gonzalez, 1999, 1).

We have seen the EU emerge as a powerful force in recent world events especially since the end of the Cold War and since the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in the United States. In the recent hostage situation between Iran and Great Britain, the EU took a strong position in support of the UK and against Iran, issuing a statement that demanded Iran release the hostages, unharmed, and that there was no issues open for negotiation in the matter. This was a strong message that served to show Europeans that the EU is capable of wielding a united and strong political dictate in world affairs, and could serve to positively influence those countries which have resisted full integration because they see the EU as being a politically weak and ineffective force. it’s a departure from how the EU has presented itself in the past. “Risk-averse behavior is certainly a prime characteristic of EU decision making and helps explain EU’s tendency towards lowest common denominator outcomes (Cowles and Smith, 2000, 39).”

The European Union Courts, staffed by 15 competent judges, and nine assistant judges, are well trained legal and political minds, who have handed decisions impacting the EU that have demonstrated that body’s impartiality to any one nation, and an interest and a goal of making decision in the best interest of Europeans as a whole (Henry, Hyett and Macleod, 1996, 15). Their appointments are six-year renewable terms, and each member-state participates in recommending candidates to the court (Hendry, Hyett and Macleod, 1996, 15). The court is an important component of the EU, and an important factor to attract nations to fully integrate.

It could not, perhaps, be expected that the EU would come together at inception in its various components of functionality in a fashion that would appeal to all the individual European nations. Certainly not early on or perhaps even now at this evolutionary stage in its existence, but the integrity of the EU continues to evolve and emerge as it strives to mold itself to the multi-faceted needs of its diverse European community and to take on the problems that effect its members nationally and internationally.

As the EU continues its evolution and becomes integral to the policies and decision making processes of Europe, representing the majority of Europeans as their official economic, social and political and defense representative body, then countries that do not fully integrate into the EU will be left behind as major policy is formulated that could, whether they fully integrate or not, impact them in these areas of functionality. To what extent would the EU be obligated to defend Norway if it does not fully integrate? What will become of Norway’s non-oil-based exports if Norway does not fully integrate and the EU is pressured to stop providing countries that have not fully integrated with economic trade incentives?

These are questions that should be very much in the foreground of Norway’s leaders and policy makers. To some extent, as has been discussed here, there is a growing public support of full integration, but there continue to be major obstacles to that end. Norway’s fishing industry and control of its 12-mile coastal security of its fishing industry will have to be resolved before Norway can move to fully integrate with the EU. It is in Norway’s best interest to work fast and hard in resolving the issues that prevent it from fully integrating, since Norway will want to be a part of the emerging policy and decisions that are coming out of the EU.

One of the most significant points in support of the EU, and one which makes possible for Norway and other non-EU countries to eventually fully integrate, is the fact that the EU has issued economic and defense policies that largely reflect those of the European free world. That is, that they have stayed focused on the reduction of weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and achieving a level of economic equality and prosperity that would benefit all Europeans. This should serve to build Norwegian confidence that if they were to fully integrate, that the future would move in a direction that kept the well being of all Europeans in mind.

Whether or not at the end of the day Norway will fully integrate will depend on Norwegian voters. It is difficult to predict the mood of a people, or the events that might arise in the world that could impact one way or the other the decisions Norwegians make for themselves. What is certain, is that the world, not just Europe, appears to be moving towards a united World community, and at some point it is not difficult to imagine the EU playing a significant role in the development and unification of the world community. Unfortunately, if there are foreseeable problems, those problems arise out of the fact that the ongoing efforts for unification are at the European level, and not the world level, leaving out the Americas and other nations around the world. As the EU has already learned, integrating countries that do not have a role in the process of formulating policies that impact those people who are governed by those policies, can prove an undoing feature of the progress made to date.

However, at the European level, because the EU has pursued a policy of patience and cooperation and coordination with all European nations, it is not difficult to see a totally unified European continent within the next 50 years, perhaps sooner.

Bibliography http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5009587134

Burch, Stuart. “Norway and 1905: Stuart Burch Considers the Significance to Norway-Both in Terms of the Past and the Present-of the Anniversary of 1905, When the Country at Last Won Its Independence from Sweden.” History Today, June 2005, 2+. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5009587134. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=110121817

Cowles, Maria Green and Michael Smith, eds. The State of the European Union: Risks, Reforms, Renewals, and Revival. Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=110122169. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001268517

Gonzalez, Felippe, “European Union and Globalization,” Foreign Policy 28 (1999). Retrieved April 2, 2006, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001268517

Godal, Bjrn Tore. “Norway: An Outsider – for How Much Longer?” Speech before the European Union Studies Center, City University of New York, April 19th, 1999. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=77549521

Greve, Tim, and Tim Greve. Haakon VII of Norway: The Man and the Monarch. Edited by Thomas Kingston Derry. New York: Hippocrene Books, 1983. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=77549709. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105513581

Gsthl, Sieglinde. Reluctant Europeans: Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the Process of Integration. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105513590. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=110121817

Gsthl, Sieglinde. “3 the European Union After Amsterdam: Towards a Theoretical Approach to (Differentiated) Integration.” In the State of the European Union: Risks, Reforms, Renewals, and Revival, edited by Cowles, Maria Green and Michael Smith, 42-88. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=110121913. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002081376

Ingebritsen, Christine. “The Scandinavian Way and Its Legacy in Europe.” Scandinavian Studies 74, no. 3 (2002): 255+. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002081376. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=15285714

Kelber, Mim, ed. Women and Government: New Ways to Political Power. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=15285813. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=95076972

MacLeod, I., I.D. Hendry, and Stephen Hyett. The External Relations of the European Communities: A Manual of Law and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=95077334. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002404355

Thaden, Edward. “State and People in the History of Northern Norwegians and White Sea and Kola Russians.” East European Quarterly 35, no. 2 (2001): 129. http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002404355.

Vollebaek, Knut. “Norway and the EU: No, No… Yes?” European Affairs. Summer/Fall 2003.