Section I: Introduction

The formation of the Department of Homeland Security after September 11 was an organizational and administrative response to the failure of the intelligence community to mitigate the attack. Although it predated the 9/11 Commission, the Department of Homeland Security benefitted from the results of the 9/11 Commission report, which advised a stronger information sharing culture in the intelligence community. It has been assumed that intelligence sharing under an umbrella organization will prevent future attacks, facilitate intelligence gathering, and enable the formation of trans-national intelligence communities that can more effectively respond to the threat of non-state actors. On the other hand, research has not uniformly shown the Department of Homeland Security to be effective. The Department of Homeland Security has led to major changes in the role and function of law enforcement. Whether these changes are predicted to be positive in terms of achieving national security goals is the key concern guiding this research.

Section II: Research Question

Will the formation of the Department of Homeland Security improve US intelligence sharing on terrorism? This research question calls for a predictive study. The dependent variable is the improvement of US intelligence sharing on terrorism, both among federal intelligence agencies but also with local law enforcement and international allies in the global intelligence community. The independent variable of main interest is the formation of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of September 11, particularly as the organization was supported by the results of the 9/11 Commission report. The case studies involve agencies in the US intelligence community.

There are no obvious answers to the specific research question. On the one hand, the United States intelligence community has done a commendable job and research shows that the Department of Homeland Security has helped local law enforcement agencies to adapt and change their organizational cultures to meet the new demands of inter-agency cooperation and information sharing. On the other hand, research shows how bureaucratic consolidation and control is not necessarily effective, particularly with regards to intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security could even be construed as presenting a net risk that detracts from overall counterterrorism gains. Inspired by the need to improve local law enforcement responses to potential threats, I developed this research question to determine the best methods of public administration. The results of this research are of direct interest to the intelligence community, informing best policies and practices.

Section III: Related Literature

There is a substantial body of scholarly literature on the formation and subsequent effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security. Scholarly literature can be used to effectively predict the overall benefits of Department of Homeland Security, specifically focusing on benefits to the intelligence community. The literature can be used to inform public policy on how to more effectively restructure the organization or if necessary, dismantle it. Moreover, the literature addresses specific issues related to how local and state law enforcement play a role in homeland security. For example, Brodeur (2007) claims that since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security, law enforcement has been construed as having two distinct roles: “low” and “high,” (p. 25). The low roles of law enforcement refer to the localized crime fighting functions familiar to all agencies, whereas the high functions of law enforcement are specifically linked to their integration with counterterrorism efforts at the national level. High policing reflects the Department of Homeland Security’s “power conflation,” and places officers of the law in the service of the state. Similarly, Marks and Sun (2007) focus on the specific impact of the Department of Homeland Security on local law enforcement organizational structures and cultures. In their longitudinal content analysis, the authors found that indeed law enforcement agencies have changed significantly in terms of their leadership, structure, and culture. Unlike Brodeur (2007), Marks and Sun (2007) found net positive results from the changes taking place at the local law enforcement level.

Several scholars like DeBrujin (2006) and Teirney (2003) predict negative net repercussions from the formation of the Department of Homeland Security. DeBrujin (2006) claims that the 9/11 Commission overlooked essential facts related to intelligence sharing and the methods by which intelligence agencies work. Likewise, DeBrujin (2006) points out that centralized information sharing is highly risky for several reasons, and that intelligence fragmentation is preferable because of the redundancies it creates. Moreover, DeBrujin (2006) shows how centralization under the Department of Homeland Security removes the benefits of checks and balances in the intelligence community. Tierney (2003) points out that the formation of the Department of Homeland Security was largely reactive and ill-advised, ignoring a wide body of evidence from psychology and sociology. According to Teirney (2003), the formation of the Department of Homeland Security was an ineffective response to disaster management needs and to terrorism specifically. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security was based on “the assumption that the public will panic during large-scale emergencies and the idea that disasters are best managed through hierarchies of command and control,” which is not substantiated in the literature (Tierney 33). Interestingly, though, Parker and Stern (2002) also use psychology and sociology to show that the Department of Homeland Security might in fact lead to net intelligence gains. Parker and Stern (2002) explain why centralization was a natural response to being caught off guard after September 11, and that the Department of Homeland Security fulfills organizational psychology and political goals.

Section IV: Annotated Bibliography

Brodeur, Jean-Paul, 2007, “High and Low Policing in Post-9/11 Times.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 25–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pam002

This article shows how the formation of the Department of Homeland Security and other organizational structure changes have impacted the practice of policing. Specifically, the author refers to the differentiation between “high” and “low” policing. High policing is characterized by “absorbent policing, power conflation, protection of the state and the use of covert informants,” (Brodeur, 2007, p. 25). Low policing refers to localized application of criminal justice resources. This article is also helpful in illuminating the challenges and opportunities inherent in the increased use of private security agencies in the high policing model.

DeBruijn, Hans, 2006. “One Fight, One Team.” Public Administration, Vol. 84, Issue 2, June 2006, pp. 267-287.

Referring to the 9/11 Commission report, DeBruijn points out that prior to September 11, the United States intelligence community and its global counterparts were “over-fragmented” and “guilty of not sharing enough information,” (p. 267). The 9/11 Commission essentially provided substantial grounds for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, a central control and command structure that theoretically facilitates information sharing under a common rubric. DeBrujin points out that the 9/11 Commission overlooked essential facts, and that information sharing is highly risky. Moreover, the author shows how centralization under the Department of Homeland Security rubric presents clear intelligence risks and removes the benefits of checks and balances in the intelligence community.

Marks, Daniel E. and Ivan Y. Sun, 2007, “The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development Among State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 159-173.

The Marks and Sun article focuses on the impact of post-9/11 organizational policies on American law enforcement agencies, which is different from the literature that focuses purely on federal agencies. In this empirical study, the researchers use content analysis methods to evaluate specific organizational changes taking place in American law enforcement agencies as a result of September 11. Changes that have been noted include the evolution of counterterrorism units at the local level, changes in organizational procedures, greater openness with regards to information sharing, and more collaborative practices. Unlike some of the pessimistic literature, this study shows how the Department of Homeland Security might lead to improved counterterrorism responses.

Parker, Charles F. and Erik K. Stern, 2002, “Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise.” Political Psychology, Vol. 23, Issue 3, Sept 2002, pp. 601-630.

How was it possible that the September 11 attacks were a “bolt from the blue,” as they have been called (Parker and Stern 601)? This research takes a different methodological direction from other literature. In particular, the Parker and Stern (2002) study relies on political psychology and social science methods. The researchers show how and why policymakers could have been caught so off guard. The authors draw from psychological, bureau–organizational, and agenda–political disciplines. This research can offer a nuanced and novel approach to understanding how the organizational culture responses vis-a-vis the Department of Homeland Security might prove effective.

Tierney, Kathleen, 2003. “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests.” In Lee Clark (Ed.) Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.33 – 51.

Using evidence from psychology and sociology, Tierney points out that the formation of the Department of Homeland Security was an ineffective response to disaster management needs. The formation of the Department of Homeland Security was based on “the assumption that the public will panic during large-scale emergencies and the idea that disasters are best managed through hierarchies of command and control,” (Tierney 33). Expanded centralized powers do not effectively mitigate or manage risk. In fact, the public has proven itself to be remarkably resilient. Strict organizational controls do not necessarily result in a more robust intelligence community.

References

Brodeur, Jean-Paul, 2007, “High and Low Policing in Post-9/11 Times.” Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1 January 2007, Pages 25–37, https://doi.org/10.1093/police/pam002

DeBruijn, Hans, 2006. “One Fight, One Team.” Public Administration, Vol. 84, Issue 2, June 2006, pp. 267-287.

Marks, Daniel E. and Ivan Y. Sun, 2007, “The Impact of 9/11 on Organizational Development Among State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies.” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 159-173.

Parker, Charles F. and Erik K. Stern. “Blindsided? September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise.” Political Psychology, Vol. 23, Issue 3, Sept 2002, pp. 601-630.

Tierney, Kathleen, 2003. “Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests.” In Lee Clark (Ed.) Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.33 – 51.